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Abstract
The story of the land war of the American Revolution has been told many times.
However, the naval conflict remains largely ignored except for its most famous aspects,
such as the voyages of John Paul Jones. When the sea battles of the Revolution have
been discussed it has mostly been in the context of the end of the war when the navy had
already existed for some time. Historians such as William Fowler and Nathaniel Miller
have attempted comprehensive studies of the Continental Navy, but neither focus on the
character and significance of naval combat in the first year of the war.
The early naval battles of 1775-1776 demonstrate that the navy of the United
Colonies was still a decentralized, disorganized force that was controlled not by a central
governing agency but by independent local leaders. These men looked for opportunities
for success and valor, perhaps even for personal profit, and took advantage of
opportunities as they arose, whether it was part of the navy’s larger plan or not. These
characteristics were illustrated in the Battle of Machias, the Battle of Nassau, and the
Battle of Valcour, in each of which men acted on their own initiative, and with the
exception of Valcour, experienced success. The valuable and unique nature of the naval
war of the American Revolution from 1775-1776 becomes clear through a close
examination of the formation of the Continental Navy and the interconnections between
the land and sea war.
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The first shot of the American Revolution came in April 1775 at Lexington,
Massachusetts.2 In the centuries since the American Revolution, it has been the subject
of wide-ranging scholarship that has adopted multiple perspectives and intepretations.
One area that has lacked careful research and close scrutiny, is the role of the naval
battles and the Continental Navy itself. Although the Continental Navy only played a
role until 1778, at which time the French navy took over the naval front of the war, it laid
the foundation for the United States Navy.3 In the early years of the war this navy was
anything but regulated. After the creation of the Continental Navy in 1775, John Adams
created rules and regulations that were to govern the new defense force.4 However, these
distant guidelines were rarely followed by the Continental Navy. While there were
problems with having a decentralized naval force, it did provide the rebellious colonies
with some advantages over Great Britain. With the American naval forces having little
oversight, they were able to act with far greater flexibility than their British counterparts,
who were restricted by the goals and designs of their superiors. The flexibility of the
American naval forces and army allowed them to immediately react to local conditions in
the most expeditious manner.
This independent, flexible, and decentralized spirit among the naval forces can be
seen especially clearly before the navy was officially formed. In May 1775, colonists in
Machias, Maine, rose up against Ichabod Jones, a trader from Boston. Although the
Patriots were not necessarily in the majority there, they saw an opportunity to further the
2

Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956),
68.
3
William M. Fowler, Rebels Under Sail (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 89-90.
4
United States Continental Congress, Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies
(Philadelphia, 1775).



cause in which they believed. This independent spirit and willingness to take action,
carried through the early years of the war.5 This same spirit was seen in Esek Hopkins’s
cruise to New Providence in the Bahamas. Instead of following his orders to cruise
Narragansett Bay, Hopkins sailed to the Bahamas and led an amphibious assault against
Fort Nassau. Although this was a successful assault, and secured valuable supplies for
the Americans, Hopkins violated his orders, an extreme measure even for the
decentralized nature of the navy, and attacked a British colony instead of just protecting
the American coast. Hopkins went to New Providence because he saw a valuable
opportunity and took advantage of it. These actions further demonstrate the localized and
independent spirit that was evident in the Continental Navy.6
The Battle of Valcour also highlighted these characteristics. Although this was
performed as a legitimate military act against Great Britain, it still demonstrated that
Benedict Arnold was willing to go beyond his duties as an army officer to make a naval
assault on the Royal Navy. In October 1776, Arnold led a quickly assembled American
fleet against the much stronger British Navy. While a defeat for the Americans, they
fought valiantly and secured a secondary strategic goal in delaying the British advance,
which proved that an independent, decentralized force could indeed make a difference.7
These battles demonstrated that in the opening phase of the American Revolution the
United Colonies’ naval forces relied heavily on the independent decisions of the men
who led them. The Battle of Machais, the Battle of Nassau, and the Battle of Valcour,

5

James Lyons, “Chairman of Machias Committee to Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” reprinted in
Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 1774-1775, Volume 1, comp. William Bell Clark, (United
States Naval Department, 1964), 676-677.
6
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 96.
7
Pennsylvania Gazette, October 23, 1776, reprinted Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 1776,
Volume 6, comp. William James Morgan (Naval History Division Department of Navy, 1972), 1391.
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together demonstrate that the success of the Continental Navy was based on strong
individual leaders.



Chapter One: The British Navy
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The end of the eighteenth century was a time of change in the British Navy. The
social status of naval careers was rising in Britain, and the Royal Navy became seen as a
respectable career path for the sons of gentlemen to take if they were not inheriting land.9
Despite this change, a majority of the officers in the navy were not sons of gentlemen,
although these young men did have the best chance of becoming commissioned
officers.10 On the other end of the spectrum were the young men that joined the navy but
were illiterate; for them the likelihood of receiving a commission was almost nonexistent.11 At this time the admiralty had to rely on being given good candidates for
officers, as there was little that they could do to train or educate them. The only true
method that existed was the Naval Academy, founded in 1737, at Portsmouth. This
venue for educating future officers did not play much of a role and usually only had
around forty students.12 Thus they relied on the already educated to rise through the
ranks based on their performance, as opposed to a formal training program for their
officers.13
In addition to growing respectability, the late eighteenth century also led to the
creation of semi-professional specialization among the commissioned officers. Most of
this development came in the form of transport agents who were employed and
uniformed by the Navy Board. In addition, promotions increasingly became based on
skill, as opposed to political connections. Lord Sandwich, who was named Lord of the

9

N.A.M Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2004), 388-391.
10
Ibid, 383.
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Ibid, 386.
13
Ibid.



British Admiralty for the third time in 1770, carried this out.14 Under his leadership the
Royal Navy would go to war against their North American colonies. His strategy during
this conflict was greatly affected by tensions that existed between Lord North, Lord
George (Secretary of State for the Colonies), and himself.15 Nonetheless, from the time
that the conflict broke out in British North America the necessity for naval involvement
was clear.16 The role that the Royal Navy would play in the American Revolution faced
more than ideological road blocks. This was in part caused by the disarmament of the
Royal Navy during peace time. Once war broke out, the Navy had to be essentially
rebuilt and staffed.17 At this particular time the Royal Navy had a problem with manning
its ships both with seamen and officers.18
Due to these difficulties, the Royal Navy initially served primarily as a means to
transport troops during the conflict with the colonies. However, after the landing of
troops in Boston failed to solve the problem in 1775, a more direct approach was decided
upon.19 The next phase was for Vice Admiral Lord Howe and Major General Sir William
Howe to launch an amphibious attack that involved landing the army on Long Island,
then crossing Manhattan and finally routing the rebel army.20 By 1776, as the war
intensified, “the Navy and Vicutalling Boards had taken up over 146,000 tons of
transports, 46,000 tons more than the maximum of the previous war.”21 Although the
Royal Navy made a significant commitment to the conflict in the mainland colonies, this
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Ibid, 329 and 390.
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Ibid, 381.
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Ibid, 333.
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conflict was not its main focus. Instead Great Britain was focused on the looming war
with France and Spain, which posed a much more direct threat to their safety, and thus
required more direct attention from the British navy.22
One of the reasons that the Royal Navy became as involved as it did in the North
American conflict were the attacks by American privateers on British vessels. After
Captain John Manley’s American squadron proved to be enough to contend with the
dispersed Royal Navy in May 1777, it became clear that a greater naval presence was
needed there because a small American force was able to vanquish ships of the Royal
Navy.23 However, a large portion would not be stationed in the colonies until after the
Battle of Saratoga in 1777, at which point it became clear that the French were going to
get involved. The imminent involvement of the French navy in the conflict forced Lord
Sandwich to commit more of the Royal Navy to the North American conflict than the
conflicts that were emerging in Europe.24 The British navy may not have been heavily
involved in the American conflict at the onset, but it did force the colonists to take to the
sea to combat the ships that were stationed there, especially in response to the blockade
against Boston.25
The Royal Navy also aided the success of the Continental Navy because of the
changes that it underwent at the time of the Revolutionary conflict. Following the Seven
Years War, the conflict between the European powers turned to the interior of the
continent, meaning that Britain had to rely more upon her land troops than her navy. This

22

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Ibid, 335-336.
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shift in focus caused Great Britain to appear vulnerable as a naval force.26 Thus, when
the American Revolution broke out Britain had to rebuild her navy. In addition they were
faced with the problem of operating far from home.27 In addition, the administration of
Lord North was very disorganized in its war operations.28 Each of these factors combined
to create an atmosphere that was perfect for the colonists to develop their own naval
force. A disadvantaged Royal Navy allowed the colonists to feel confident in taking the
war to the sea, as they saw that the opportunity existed for them to be successful.
Furthermore, once war broke out between France and Britain the navy was divided,
between European and American theaters, giving the colonists and their allies an even
greater advantage.
In the second half of the eighteenth century the Royal Navy had to overcome
growing pains, “From 109 seagoing ships in 1690, the fleet had increased by 1765 to
266.”29 This a setback in ship building because there wasn’t enough money to expand
and modernize the shipyards to meet the growing demand. In addition, the navy was in
need of new ships because many of the older ships were beginning to fall apart.30 The
ability of the naval yards to expand and increase production relied on the government’s
approval. This was only one of the ways in which the government maintained firm
control over the navy and its operation.31 Whoever was lord of the admiralty made vital
decisions concerning the navy. For example, when Lord Sandwich became lord of the
admiralty he discontinued the program established by Egmont to improve the shipyards.
26
27
28
29
30
31
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However, a few years later when finances improved he reinstated his program. The fact
that the government had so much control over the navy that it could change a critical part
of the Royal Navy’s development, demonstrated how centralized it was. This was in
direct contrast to the Continental Navy and other naval operations within the colonies that
relied more on each captain’s individual decisions than those that were made by the
Continental Congress.
As a whole the Royal Navy at the end of the eighteenth century was still a
powerful force, but not as powerful as it was prior to the Seven Years War. This slight
decline demonstrated to the world and to the colonies that if there was a time to take on
the Royal Navy, this was it. In addition, the British government was more concerned
with maintaining their financial balance than making improvements to shipyards that
were necessary for creating an even stronger force. This demonstrated that the British
Navy was at a crossroads, and that the government alone determined the path which it
would take. This not only opened the door for the colonists to effectively take on the
British navy, but also demonstrated how different the Continental and Royal Navy were
in their administration. The colonists did not want their government, or the organization
of their navy, to follow the very centralized British tradition. The Royal Navy had long
been a symbol of tyranny and power abuse, which the colonists wanted to avoid. Instead,
the revolutionary colonies succeeded in creating a decentralized, flexible navy.32

32
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Chapter Two: The Battle of
Machias
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Barely a month after the opening shots of the American Revolution were fired at
Lexington and Concord, the first naval action of the war occurred in Machias, Maine.34
The battle broke out after Ichabod Jones, a merchant from Boston and a loyalist,
attempted to get supplies from Machias. The group of Patriot colonists in the town took
action to ensure that none of their lumber would fall into British hands. They attacked
the British ship, the Margaretta, and Jones’s two sloops, the Unity and the Polly.
Although this naval battle was very brief it was the first naval battle of the war, and
demonstrated the decentralized and flexible spirit of the colonies in this early phase.
In William Fowler’s Rebels Under Sail and in Nathan Miller’s Sea of Glory, the
Battle of Machias is presented as laying the foundation for the formation of the
Continental Navy. Both Fowler and Miller spend their few pages on Machias discussing
what happened just prior to and during the battle. The main difference between these two
accounts was that Fowler focused on constructing his own account of the battle, which
focused heavily on the people that were involved. The description of the battle itself was
brief, but effectively informed the reader of what transpired.35 Miller also informed the
reader of what happened during the battle and just after, but he spent more time on the
injuries and damages that were done during the battle. For example, Miller discussed
how the school was transformed into a hospital to care for the wounded, a fact that was
completely absent from Fowler’s.36 In addition, Miller incorporated more direct quotes

34

Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 17.
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 18-19.
36
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from primary sources, while Fowler just presented the information.37 As a pair, these
texts presented a comprehensive view of the Battle of Machias. Fowler gave a clear
picture of the battle, while Miller emphasized the physical costs of the battle. While each
text took a slightly different approach to the battle they each came to the same conclusion
that the Battle of Machias, to quote William Fowler, “had done much to strengthen the
cause of those in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress who were urging a naval
armament.”38
Miller and Fowler may have approached the Battle of Machias in very similar
ways, but another view was presented in the journal The Aldine, in an article titled “The
Lexington of the Sea.” This article was published in 1876, during the countires
centennial. Thus, the article captured the fervor for the Revolution that was presented at
this time. This article focused on James Fenimore Cooper’s account of the battle in The
History of the Navy of the United States of America, volume One.39 It was Cooper who
first made the comparison between the Battle of Lexington and the Battle of Machias,
Lexington being the first battle on land and Machias the first battle at sea.40 Since
Cooper provided this designation, a large part of this brief article quoted directly from
Cooper’s work. While it was interesting to read about Cooper’s view of the battle, it did
not lend itself to any deeper understanding. The most useful part of this article was the
opening when the author discussed the problems that the colonies faced in establishing a
naval force. The author wrote that the colonies struggled to have a naval force because it

37

Miller, Sea of Glory, 36.
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 20.
39
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40
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was harder to create or maintain than an army because vessels were required, and because
it was unlikely that any naval attacks on Great Britain would be successful.41
The colonists at Machias proved, though, that it was possible for a small force of
colonists to take on a British ship and be successful. It began when Captain Ichabod
Jones, a loyalist merchant out of Boston, arrived in Machias with his two ships the Unity
and the Polly in May 1775.42 There was nothing unusual about this encounter as Jones
often traded with the residents of the town, serving the dual purpose of bringing them
provisions, and trading with them for his own profit.43 Jones was such a frequent visitor
to Machias that he even owned an estate there.44 He knew the people well, and thus was
well aware that a section of the Machias population would not respond favorably to his
presence.45
The concern that the Patriot colonists of Machias would do something to the
loyalist Jones and his ship was so great that Vice Admiral Samuel Graves was informed,
“Whereas his Excellency the Governor hath represented to me that some of the
Inhabitants of the Eastern parts of this Province have threatened to intercept and destroy
the Vessels of Mr. Ichabod Jones […]”46 Graves acknowledged the importance of this
fear, but he did not cancel Jones’ trip to Machias, where he was getting lumber for the
Royal Navy. In order to give Jones a better chance of being successful, Graves arranged

41

Ibid, 67-68.
“James Lyons, Chairman of Machias Committee ,” volume 1, 676.
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Ibid.
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for an armed schooner, the Margaretta, captained by James Moore, to be an escort.47
Although he had good intentions in providing an armed escort, the presence of the
schooner made the colonists at Machias more suspicious of Jones’s and his intentions.
Once arriving in Machias, Jones did his best to avoid conflict with the colonists.
He did not want his trip there to spark violence between Patriots and Loyalists, he wanted
to trade. In order to avoid conflict Jones requested that colonists sign a petition stating
that they approved of trading with him. 48 When first presented with this petition a
majority of the colonists signed it. However, once they learned that he intended to trade
with the British, according to James Lyons, some colonists regretted that they signed the
petition. The colonists claimed they were unaware of Jones’ true intentions when they
signed this petition.49 Although it was likely that some were unaware of Jones’s
intentions, it was doubtful that even a majority of those who signed the petition were
ignorant of his loyalties. In an article published on August 14, 1775, in the Newport
Mercury, referred to Jones as “that noted friend of government,” which demonstrated that
his loyalties to Britain were no secret.50 The well-known nature of Jones’s loyalties
suggested that Lyons may have overstated the number of colonists that wanted to attack
the Margaretta when he wrote to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety.51
Lyons benefited from making it appear to Massachusetts as if more colonists
supported the attack on Jones and the British because it justified their actions at a time
when the colonies were just beginning to fight the British. In addition, a positive account

47
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of the battle would earn him more support from the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety.52 However, this was not the case, as the attack on Jones and the Margaretta was
carried out by a small number of Patriot colonists. It was unlikely that any of these men
had signed the petition that Jones shared with the town, further undermining Lyons’s
attempt to justify their actions by stating that the petition was misleading.53 Thus when
the attack did occur, lead by men such as Jeremiah O’Brien, it was not an example of an
organized, premeditated attack carried out by the entire town, but rather an assault
performed by the small Patriot contingent in Machias who saw an opportunity to weaken
the British and took it.54 The attack began while Captain James Moore and another
officer of the Margaretta were onshore in Machias at the Meeting House. At this time
the Patriots of Machias made their first attack on the British naval officers in their midst.
Had they been successful here, the mob may have stopped with the attack at the Meeting
House, but Moore and the other officer managed to escape in an offshore schooner, and
thus the fight between the H.M.S. Margaretta and the colonists of Machias took to the
sea.55
The colonists of Machias involved in the attack began by plundering one of
Jones’ sloops that was anchored at the falls (see figure 1). Upon catching up to the
schooner that carried Jones and Moore, the colonists demanded that it surrender to the
Sons of Liberty.56 The main reason that the colonists wanted to capture the ship was so
that they could take Jones prisoner because they blamed him, as a merchant, for the
52
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problems that they had, such as increased taxes.57 Once again though, the matter was not
to be settled so briefly. Moore refused to surrender to these rogue Patriot colonists, and
for the time being the colonists actually allowed Moore and Jones’s to depart. The
conflict resumed later that evening.58
Figure 1:

59

The fighting resumed at this time, because Captain Moore began to move the
Margaretta down river so that it was closer to Jones’s sloops. In order to prevent this,
the colonists ran Moore and the Margaretta aground. They demanded that he “strike to
the Sons of Liberty, threatening with Death if he resisted […].”60 This time Moore’s
refusal was not allowed to go unpublished. The Patriot colonists exchanged fire with the
Margaretta. The attack did not last long, and tipped off small bouts of fighting, which
continued throughout the night.61 The fighting during the night was the result of attempts
made by the Patriot colonists to board the Margaretta. The British sailors refused to let
57
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the colonists take advantage of them so easily, and fighting lasted for the remainder of the
night.62 In order to avoid further attack, the Margaretta dropped down stream with the
assistance of a local sloop commanded by Captain Toby (see figure 2).63
Figure 2:

64

Jones and Moore attempted to complete their escape the next dawn by heading
into the Bay of Fundy, once again with the assistance of Captain Toby. By this time the
Patriot colonists were fired up and were looking for a fight. Despite the Sons of Liberty
being in the minority at Machias, they persisted in their attack even as the British made
their final attempt to leave peacefully.65 When captains Jeremiah O’Brien and Benjamin
Foster, and the twenty to forty men who followed them, decided to pursue the British,
they were not acting in the interest of the community, but rather in the interest of the local
chapter of the Sons of Liberty.66 Nonetheless, these two men were able to raise a force
that took advantage of a lone Royal Navy schooner, which gave the colonists an
62
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opportunity to overpower the British at sea. In order to chase down Jones and Moore,
O’Brien and his outfit of forty men used one of Jones’s captured merchant sloops to
chase the Margaretta.67 In its current state Jones’s sloop did not stand a chance against
an armed schooner of the Royal Navy; it would have been quickly destroyed if the
Margaretta fired any broadsides. This, however, did not deter O’Brian and his troops
who built breastworks on the former merchant sloop as they pursued the Margaretta and
Jones.68
Once O’Brian and his crew caught up with Jones the two ships began an exchange
of fire in the bay (see figure 3).69 In the course of this fighting the Patriots mortally
wounded Captain James Moore, who later died at the Jones’ second home in Machias.70
Other than Captain Moore, the British saw only five men wounded. The colonists,
however, had six wounded men, one of whom later died, but during the battle, they like
the British suffered only one casualty.71 Although the results of the battle were evenly
matched on both sides, the colonists succeeded in taking a number of the British men
captive, including Captain Jones himself.72 In addition the colonists captured Jones’s
other sloop, the Margaretta, and the cargo that these ships held. This included “four
double fortified [sic] three pounders, & fourteen swivels, and a number of small arms
[and] a very small quantity of ammunition.”73 The plunder that the colonists at Machias
seized as a result of this early battle was where their true victory against the British lay.
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Figure 3:

74

This early victory would not have occurred had it not been for the actions of a few
men acting on their intuitions. While the idea may have existed before the battle actually
occurred, the actions that the colonists actually took were the result of the opportunities
that presented themselves at the time of the battle and the leadership of Captain O’Brian.
For example, had Captain Moore and his other officer not been at the Meeting House the
colonists would not have had the opportunity to plunder one of Jones’s ships, which
would later help them in catching up to the Margaretta. In an organized fight with a less
independent leader the colonists would never have been able to react as quickly to the
unique opportunities that presented themselves. This battle, which started the naval war
of the American Revolution, set the stage for a war of unorganized battles and
independent leaders that took advantage of opportunities for victory as they came, instead
of developing a carefully planned strategy.
74
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Although this independent action taken by Jeremiah O’Brian and the colonists at
Machias led to a Patriot victory off of the Maine coast, it also created problems that the
colonists were not prepared to deal with. For example, deciding what to do with the
prisoners they took. Determining what to do with the prisoners taken during this
engagement was no small feat as many men had been taken. The men taken prisoner
included, “Capt. Knight. Lieut. Spry, five Midshipmen and Warrant Officers, together
with 17 privates […]”.75 James Lyons, chair of the Machias Committee of Safety,
suggested that they send the prisoners to Pownalborough, on the Kennebec River, in a
letter he sent to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.76 This Congress decided during
their meeting on July 13, 1775 to appoint an officer from the Watertown militia and a
guard of no more than eight men, to convey the prisoners from Machias to Worcester.77
Once they arrived in Worcester the men were to be imprisoned indefinitely.78 Only two
of the prisoners had a different fate. Jedediah Preble and Enoch Freeman, esquires, were
required to build whaleboats as a public service instead of being imprisoned.79
It was likely that Preble and Freeman were given this lighter sentence because
they were skilled shipwrights or because they played little to no role in the fighting that
occurred. Ichabod Jones also had a different experience as a prisoner, because of the key
role that the colonists attributed to him. Instead of being sent directly to Worcester he
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was detained in Machias.80 On July 28, 1775 the Massachusetts House of
Representatives received a petition from Jones’s wife, Apphia, requesting that her
husband, still in Machias, be allowed to appear before the Massachusetts General Court.81
The result of Apphia Jones’ request was that her husband was moved to the prison in
Worcester with the other men that were captured at Machias. However, upon his arrival
Jones was kept in solitary confinement, until the Massachusetts Council ordered that he
be allowed to interact with the other prisoners.82 This harsh punishment demonstrated
that to the Patriots he was a traitor and a threat. While this judgment was overly harsh it
demonstrated that the Patriot colonists at Machias were waiting for the opportunity to go
after the British. The arrival of Ichabod Jones with an armed escort provided this
opportunity.
Dealing with the British prisoners taken at Machias was only one of the tasks that
had to be completed after the battle occurred, for the Massachusetts Provincial Congress
created a special committee to examine what had occurred at Machias. They looked at
how similar problems should be dealt with, and whether or not naval protection should be
provided for the colony.83 Thus, when the Massachusetts Provincial Congress received a
request from Machias on July 7, 1775 requesting an armed sloop, it went to this
committee.84 Machias was given permission to outfit this sloop, and Massachusetts
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would provide a captain for it.85 An entry in the journal of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives on July 28, 1775, recommended that an additional force be sent to
Machias to protect the town’s sheep and cattle from British plunder.86 By August 18,
1775 Machias had also been approved to have a small troop and to receive supplies from
Massachusetts to outfit it. Each of these measures was taken because the residents of
Machias feared that the British would seek vengeance for the Patriot victory.87
Although there was a great deal of concern about the safety of Machias after this
battle, fear was not the only sentiment present. After their victory, there was an outburst
of patriotic sentiment among the colonists in the town. This patriotism was so strong that
it even gained the notice of George Washington. In a letter to the General Court of
Massachusetts Bay he stated, “I cannot but Applaud their Spirit and Zeal.”88 This same
“Spirit and Zeal” which motivated the Patriot colonists in Machias to attack the
Margaretta made them want to invade Nova Scotia, to further bring the war to the
British. Washington, as much as he appreciated their desire to fight, condemned this
notion, saying that it was foolish and that Nova Scotia had done nothing to provoke an
attack from the colonies.89
The Battle of Machias both demonstrated and furthered the independent spirit of
some of the residents of the town. Men such as Jeremiah O’Brian and Benjamin Foster
took action when they saw it as profitable, not when they received orders from a captain
85
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of the militia, or when they were left with no choice but to fight back. The British did not
attack the colonists at Machias, the colonists attacked an armed British schooner and two
merchant sloops that belonged to an American merchant who was a loyalist. These
colonists took advantage of their strengths, such as capturing one of Jones’s fast sailing
sloops early on, to overwhelm the small British force at this small port. There was no
plan ahead of time for this battle, as can be seen with the different phases it went through,
such as firing on the British throughout the night and pursuing them to the Bay of Fundy,
because the actions of the British here could not have been predicted ahead of time.90 In
addition, because of the location of Machias on the periphery of the United Colonies’
made it easier for the colonists to act on their own, given their distance from the central
government. This allowed them to act without fear of repercussions from the
Massachusetts government of Continental Congress for their actions. Had Machias been
more centrally located the colonists may have been stopped or punished for acting against
the majority in order to attack the British.
The Battle of Machias demonstrated how flexible, unorganized battles and naval
forces could be effective if they had an independent leader, but it also demonstrated some
of the problems that came from these types of actions. For one, the colonists at Machias
did not have a plan for what to do with the prisoners and had to turn to Massachusetts for
advice. They also had not considered until after the battle that retaliation was a
possibility. In addition to the lack of forethought, these early battles led by strong willed
independent men often ignored the opinion of the majority. Despite the shortcomings
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that came with a decentralized, independent force, the Battle at Machias did help to
further naval operations in the war and the efforts to create a Continental naval force.

2

Chapter Three: The Formation of the Continental Navy
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The formation of a national naval force was a laborious process for the colonists
at the onset of the Revolutionary conflict. It was met with both great resistance, and
some very strong support. Much of the support came from John Adams, who was cited
as the father of the Continental Navy.92 The hesitation to create a navy did not stem from
lack of experience, but from a hesitation to commit to the conflict with Great Britain.
Although the Continental Navy was officially created in 1775, not even a year after the
debates began, its development would last until the very end of the war. Ultimately, this
naval force laid the foundation for the modern American Navy, but the Continental Navy
itself did not survive the Revolutionary period.
As in Britain, the sea played an important role in the lives of North American
colonists.93 For John Adams, the prevalence of the sea in American life was one of the
reasons he strongly supported an American naval force. In his autobiography Adams
stated his belief that if American seamen, “were once let loose upon the ocean, they
would contribute greatly to the relief of our wants, as well as to the distress of our
enemy.”94 As hostilities arose between the colonies and Great Britain, Adams argued that
a naval force had to be created. With a long coast to defend, and an opponent with a
strong navy, the necessity for an American naval force seemed clear. This large coast
also meant that the colonists had significant maritime experience and were prepared for
some action at sea. From 1700 to 1775 the colonies produced more vessels than they had
in the past, increasing from just four thousand burden a year to thirty-five thousands tons
per year by the end of this period. This demonstrated that the sea, which had always been
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important, was playing an even more vital social and economic role as colonial society
developed and had more of their own ships in the water.95
Perhaps as a result of this increase, men in the Continental Congress began to
realize that the colonists were capable of building a naval force to challenge Great
Britain. In a letter to John Adams on July 11, 1775, Josiah Quincy questioned why the
colonies did not have a naval force.96 However, due to colonial fears about deepening the
conflict with Great Britain its development was delayed.97 Many members of Congress
were hesitant to develop a national naval force because at this early stage in the war
reconciliation with Great Britain still seemed possible. In addition, due to sectional
divisions within the Continental Congress the delegates were unable to act decisively,
especially since Southerners feared that New England would dominate the naval force.98
Although a naval committee had existed since 1774, the first direct action that
Congress took to establish a naval force was to authorize the states to fit out their own
fleets.99 This was primarily done after two early sea battles in which American ships
demonstrated that they were capable of holding their own against the British fleet. The
first of these engagements occurred in Buzzards Bay off the coast of Cape Cod between
April and May of 1775. This battle occurred between the Royal Navy and American
smugglers, during which an American ship was captured. As a result of this engagement
the citizens of Dartmouth used their own vessels and not only reclaimed the ship, but also
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managed to take fourteen prisoners.100 Further steps to establish a naval force would take
place after the first official sea battle of the war took place in Machias, Maine.101
Machias suggested that colonists, in certain circumstances, could take on the
Royal Navy with their own ships, and, in fact, were able to instill considerable fear into
the sailors of those vessels. This mimicked Adams’s earlier view that American seamen
would be a useful and fearsome tool in the American fight against Great Britain.102 It
also demonstrated the ferocity with which the colonists believed in their cause, and their
abilities in sailing.103 Increasingly after Machias, local ships and their owners throughout
the colonies began to take on a quasi-military role. For example, the whaleboats in
Boston began to take on British ships that were troublesome to Boston’s commerce.104
The armament of these smaller vessels led General George Washington to take another
step towards a formal navy. Washington began to construct a fleet of schooners that he
refitted and armed.105 The purpose of these schooners was simply to interrupt British
shipping, not to wage war against British ships. This was a necessary precaution because
in the summer and fall of 1775 war had not been officially declared against Great Britain,
and thus outright attacks by the United States forces at sea could have potentially
worsened a situation that still might have been remedied.106
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The colonies had standing militias prior to the conflict to keep their towns safe, so
the creation of a Continental Army was much less of a jump because the foundations and
organizations for it had existed long prior to the war. However, because the colonies
never had a formal fleet to protect the coast the creation of a navy demonstrated a greater
commitment to armed conflict, which they were not ready to make until late fall of 1775.
Washington stood by his rag tag fleet despite the problems that he experienced with it,
such as officers not following orders and openly seeking conflict with British ships.107
This fleet laid a foundation for the Continental navy, and demonstrated that it was
needed, as colonists saw more attacks along the coast.
In response to the British attacks along the coast, the Continental Congress
realized that some provision needed to be made to ensure the protection of the coastal
colonies, especially the harsh reprisals against rebellious New England colonies in this
opening phase of the war. However, there was still much debate about whether the
nation should establish its own naval force.108 On July 18, 1775 it was decided that each
colony should be responsible for protecting its coast. This did not authorize a national
force, but did authorize each colony to pursue naval action against the British as
necessary to protect their shores.109 The first of the colonies to establish a state navy was
Rhode Island, and by August of 1775 they were commissioning armed ships to guard
their shores.110 As the states were protecting their own shores the Congress began
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working towards the creation of a national navy. One of the first steps taken towards this
was the presentation of the Rhode Island Resolutions on October 7, 1775 to the
Continental Congress.111 This resolution suggested the construction of a full-scale
American fleet. However, it was met with ridicule as many congressmen saw a navy as
unnecessary and therefore did not understand why Rhode Islanders wanted to spend so
much money on one. There was great concern that the new navy would be concentrated
in New England, thus giving those colonies an unfair economic advantage over others.112
The individuals who wanted to see a navy created were determined to convince the
delegates to approve a navy. This was demonstrated in Samuel Ward’s diary entry dated
October 3, 1775. He wrote that he had received a request from the Rhode Island
assembly that the delegates be persuaded to undertake the construction of a navy.113
Constituents wrote their delegates at the Continental Congress, informing them of the
desire for a naval force. However, the plea from Rhode Island did not persuade the
Congress to create a navy.
In early October, the Continental Congress received two letters from John Barry,
which proved to be the final step in convincing Congress to create a naval force, though a
small one. These letters stated that two English brigs were heading to Quebec with
munitions.114 In order to deal with this situation the Continental Congress appointed a
three-person committee of John Adams, Silas Deane, and John Langdon to find a
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solution.115 Within minutes these men proposed authorizing a squadron to intercept the
ships en route to Quebec.116 However, much like the Rhode Island Resolutions this idea
was not met with enthusiasm. Adams acknowledged that many of the Congressmen
opposed this plan because, “It was an infant, taking a mad bull by his horns; and what
was more profound and remote, it was said it would ruin the character and corrupt the
morals of all our seamen.”117 In order to combat these concerns, Adams and his
committee assured the Congress that the benefits of having a naval force that was able to
both supply and protect the Americans outweighed the concerns held by the Congress.118
This plan was accepted on Friday October 13, 1775, and the Continental Navy was
born.119 Another naval committee wanted Congress to authorize ten ships for a navy;
however, they only authorized four, which was still double what had originally been
requested.120
Now that a navy was agreed upon the work of creating it began. The original
committee was enlarged and became the Naval Committee.121 Before this navy could
take to the seas it needed rules and regulations to dictate how it would operate. This task
fell to John Adams, perhaps the greatest proponent for the creation of a navy. As can be
seen in Adams’s autobiography he truly believed that a Continental Navy would serve the
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American purpose not only because it provided the American coast with protection, but
also because it gave the American forces a better way to obtain and transport supplies.122
Adams served on the Naval Committee until 1778, and would continue to support this
committee even when he was no longer a member.123 For him, the development of a
navy was of utmost importance, which was demonstrated in his involvement in its
creation.124
On November 25, 1775, Adams presented the rules and regulations that he had
created for the Continental Navy.125 They contained forty-four articles, which governed
everything from punishment for violation of the rules to religious services.126 The very
first article made it clear that Americans feared corrupt officers who were unnecessarily
cruel. This article stated that commanders, “are strictly required to shew [sic] in
themselves a good example of honor and virtue to their men and officers […]”127 In
addition to the demand that officers behave well, there were also articles which contained
limits on the extent of punishment that could be performed. It even made clear the
different standards to which officers and seamen were to be held.128 By outlining these
distinctions in the rules of the Continental Navy it ensured that neither party could accuse
their commander of unfair treatment.
In addition to placing limits on punishment, such as no punishment could exceed
twelve lashes on the back with the cat-o-nine tails, Adams’s rules also protected the
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sailors from being dismissed at the whim of the captain. If the captain wanted to dismiss
a crewmember, he could only suspend him or have him confined, he could not force his
removal. In order for a crewmember to be removed the captain had to apply for a court
martial.129 The rules and regulations also contained details for how a court martial was to
be carried out. In addition, the captain was required to keep accurate records of any
seamen he hired and how much they were to be paid.
This measure ensured that the men would receive fair payment for their service as
promised. These rules and regulations did not just protect the crewmen in the physical
sense, but also in a moral and spiritual sense. Article two stated that religious services
were to be performed on the ship twice a day, with a sermon on Sundays. This was an
important aspect of these rules and regulations because one of the major concerns that
members of Congress had about the creation of the navy was that the sailors would be
immoral.130 With this concern assuaged by the presence of frequent religious services,
the Continental Congress was free to approve these rules and regulations, which they did
on November 28, 1775. These regulations included measures to prevent captains from
abusing their power. This was representative of the republican ideals which were evident
in the founding documents of the United States of the America, which advocated for
equality and limited power. In addition, the navy still clung to the traditional idea of
hierarchy because although the captain’s power was limited, they still had more power
than any other seaman on the ship. This mix of equality and hierarchy demonstrated that
the United Colonies were caught between the traditional, hierarchical world, and the
world of equality advocated by Republicans.
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Once the Continental Navy was voted into existence, Esek Hopkins was named as
its commander in chief.131 Hopkins was the first choice for many of the delegates to be
the commander, but it would take the convincing of his brother, Stephen, to persuade
Esek that this was a worthwhile command to accept. Stephen emphasized to his brother
that his pay as well as the portion of seized prizes awarded to him would prove quite
lucrative.132 Stephen’s method to convince Esek highlighted one of the main problems
that the Continental Navy would face in getting enough men. Many men preferred to be
privateers instead of naval seamen because of its lower risk and of its potential to make
more money.133 Although Hopkins had misgivings about accepting the appointment, it
was well received throughout the colonies. In a letter to Nicholas Cooke the Rhode
Island delegates at the Continental Congress expressed their pleasure at Hopkins’s
appointment, “Since our last We have the Honor of two Letters from You. Genl. Hopkins
has arrived very well, his accepting the Command of the Fleet gives universal
Satisfaction.”134 With rules and regulations, as well as a commander, the work
constructing the ships could begin.
Although the Continental Navy was formally created in October 1775, and the
Naval Committee became the Marine Committee in 1776, during the early years of the
war naval conduct differed by ship and was controlled by individual captains.135 From
1775 to 1776 the organization and coordination of this naval force was minimal, and
allowed men such as Esek Hopkins to act as they saw necessary, rather than as they were
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ordered, much as Jeremiah O’Brian had done at Machias. The Congress acknowledged
the problems that came from having such a decentralized navy, leading the Marine
Committee to be reformed. This time the committee was divided into different
departments that focused on specific regions.136 The Marine Committee received a great
deal of criticism, and by 1779 it became the Board of Admiralty.137
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Chapter Four: Battle of Nassau
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In early March 1776 the Continental Navy brought the American Revolution to
the Bahamas. Here they attacked Fort Nassau and Fort Montagu in New Providence,
Bahamas. The attack on Fort Nassau resulted from Captain Esek Hopkins ignoring his
orders to clear the coast, and instead sailing to New Providence in order to capture
powder that was stored in the two forts on the island. Hopkins’s disregard of his orders
demonstrated that the independent spirit, which was prevalent at the Battle of Machias,
continued into the next year of the war. Although, this attack was not an official mission
for the Continental Navy, it was one of the most important successes for the Continental
Navy had during the war. This battle was not a traditional battle between two naval
fleets, but instead was an amphibious assault against the town of New Providence. The
American success in this battle relied on the independent actions of Captain Hopkins, and
the decentralized nature of the Continental Navy, which allowed Hopkins to act in such
an independent manner.
The portrayal of the Battle of Nassau in Fowler’s Rebels Under Sail, focused on
demonstrating that the American victory at Nassau was a demonstration of British
weakness. Despite the British presence in New Providence the Americans were able to
take Fort Nassau from them with out much of a struggle. “After firing off three twelvepounders as a symbolic gesture, the defenders of the easternmost fort abandoned their
positions to the Americans.”139 Despite British weakness evident in this battle, the
American commander; however, Esek Hopkins was not spared. Fowler discussed that if
Hopkins had acted in a more direct manner they would have captured more powder,
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which would have greatly benefited the American cause. Fowler’s critiques of both the
British and American forces demonstrated that this battle truly represented the
weaknesses within the Royal troops because each side had serious weaknesses, but the
Americans managed to be victorious. Other than demonstrating the weakness of the
British Fowler painted a picture of the battle as it occurred, including the conditions
under which the Americans had made their way to New Providence. He also addressed
the fact that Esek Hopkins was able to go to the Bahamas only by ignoring orders given
to him. In sum, the presentation of the Battle of Nassau in Rebels Under Sail highlighted
the weakness of the British, while simultaneously painting a clear picture of what
transpired during the battle.
In contrast to Fowler, Miller, in Sea of Glory, did not address the weaknesses of
the British. Instead he gave a detailed description of what actually occurred during the
battle. This included not only a listing of the American ships that were present, but the
methods by which the raid was carried out, and a specific timeline for the attack on Fort
Nassau. Unlike Fowler, Miller saw the quick surrender of the forces at Nassau to the
Americans as justifiable, and not a symbol of British weakness. He did, however, still
discuss the shortcomings of Esek Hopkins as a commander, namely his delay of action,
which cost the Americans a large supply of powder. Miller’s treatment of Nassau
focused heavily on the smallpox outbreak that plagued the American forces as they were
leaving Nassau to return to the United States. Several ships were set aside as quarantines
for the sailors who became ill. This presentation of the battle was most effective because
of the very detailed description of what occurred. The rest of the text, particularly the
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section on the illness, while interesting, did not really add anything to the understanding
of the battle.
A very different approach to this battle was taken in Michael Craton’s A History
of the Bahamas. This text was very interesting because instead of detailing the battle
from the American or British perspective, in this case it was examined from the
perspective of the residents of the Bahamas. The focus of this was a simple account of
what occurred during the battle, but the focus was not on the British troops who occupied
the island, but rather on the American invaders. Like the texts by Fowler and Miller, this
text also demonstrated that the Americans easily overpowered the British. This text spent
more time looking at the two-week period during which the Americans plundered
Nassau. Craton discussed how they entertained themselves at the government palace and
consumed great amounts of wine that was either given to them or came from their
plunder. This text provided an interesting contrast to the texts of Fowler and Miller
because of the different perspective that it gave. Instead of the typical account this text
looked at how the Americans and actions were viewed by the people of the island that
was attacked.
The attack on Nassau was never supposed to happen. Commodore Esek Hopkins
was given orders to clear the coast of the United Colonies, starting in the south and
ending in Narragansett Bay. However, Hopkins decided to execute his own plan, which
involved the fleet leaving Delaware Bay and sailing to New Providence. Hopkins wanted
to go to New Providence because he knew that there was a valuable supply of weapons
and powder there, and he wanted to ensure that the Americans took possession of these
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materials.140 Hopkins’s decision to attack New Providence demonstrated that as a leader
he was an independent thinker, who, much like Jeremiah O’Brian, looked for the most
beneficial opportunities and took advantage of them. Attacking Nassau was thus more
beneficial because of the material gain that it would provide the Americans than clearing
the American coast. Thus, in early March 1776 the American fleet arrived off the coast
of New Providence, which sent waves of concern through the population of the island
(figure 1).141
Figure 1:
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In a letter to Vice Admiral Clark Gayton, New Providence resident, John Brown,
captured his concerns about the presence of the American ships off the coast,
The present distressed and defenceless (sic) State of His Majesty’s
Bahama Islands occasioned by the arrival of an Armament fitted out by
the American Colonies now in open and declared Rebellion.143
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The American fleet, which Brown saw off the coast, contained the Alfred (twenty-four
guns), the Columbus (twenty guns), the Cabot (fourteen guns), the Fly (eight guns), the
Providence (twelve guns), the Andrew Doria (fourteen guns), the Hornet (ten guns), and
the Wasp (eight guns).144 When these ships first arrived off the coast, though, the
residents of New Providence believed that they were Spaniards come to attack the
island.145 It was not until the Americans actually landed that it became clear that in fact
the invasion was not an act of aggression by Spain, but rather an attack from Britain’s
rebelling colonies.146 Despite their misidentification, Nassau was ready for the attack.
Once the ships were spotted, Governor Montforte Browne raised the alarm and had the
militia assemble.147
The militia did not deter the Americans in their goal to besiege the two forts
located in New Providence. Both Fort Montagu and Fort Nassau contained large supplies
of weapons and powder that the Americans were in desperate need of. These supplies
were the reason that the American fleet went to New Providence.148 Captain Hopkins
had no desire to hurt the population; he simply wanted to make sure that his fleet would
be allowed to take the munitions and supplies with them. To avoid unnecessary
casualties, Hopkins issued a manifesto, which stated his reasons for the attack, and gave
the people warning so that they could get to safety:149
To the Gentlemen, Freemen, and Inhabitants of the Island of New
Providence. The Reasons of my Landing an armed force on the Island is
in order to take Possession of the Powder and the Warlike Stores
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belonging to the Crown, and if I am not Opposed in putting my design in
Execution the Persons and the Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe,
neither shall they be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no
Resistance.150
In addition to the manifesto, the inhabitants of the island were led to believe that the
American ships were there at the orders of the Continental Congress. This gave the
attack more validity than if it had simply occurred because of Hopkins’s individual
decision.151 Despite Hopkins’s attempts to keep the residents of New Providence calm,
panic ensued as the American ships entered the harbor, and the attack began.152
On March 6, 1776, the American ships entered the New Providence Harbor with
the aid of a local pilot.153 The assistance of this pilot made the sail into the harbor much
easier, and provided Americans the opportunity to launch the most effective attack on
Fort Montagu and Fort Nassau.154 As the ships entered the harbor, the two forts were
armed with local troops. Strategically, the position of these two forts was extremely
effective as they were located on either side of the harbor (see figure 2). This should
have made their goal, to keep the ships from entering the harbor, simple to accomplish.
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Figure 2:

However, the forts were undermanned because the island’s troops were divided between
the two, and they were not able to do much to deter the arrival of the ships.156 Governor
Browne quickly realized that the division of the troops left the island too vulnerable to
the incoming American fleet, and thus made the decision to relocate all of the troops to
Fort Nassau, which he labeled as the more defensible position. Not only was Fort Nassau
easier to defend, it was also more valuable to the island because it contained most of the
powder that was kept on the island.157
While this was an excellent strategy, it failed to protect some of the gunpowder
and the island.158 This was in part due to the fact that the residents of New Providence
had no desire to fight the Americans, and many abandoned the fort and returned home.
This attitude, while it existed prior to the battle, heightened after the Americans
successfully took Fort Montagu in the afternoon. By ten p.m. of that day most of the
inhabitants and soldiers had left Fort Nassau, so that there were only one hundred men
left to defend the fort from the American fleet.159 Given the conditions present at Fort
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Nassau the Americans should have been able to easily take control, and get all of the
gunpowder, which was stored there. However, they were unable to do this because of
Captain Hopkins’s hesitance to act. This lack of action has led to his critique both by
historians and by men in his own crew. Although the American fleet did capture some of
the gunpowder, a majority of it was removed from the island before the Americans
started the attack.160
Governor Browne made the decision, during a council of war, to send the island’s
valuable powder to St. Augustine, where he hoped that it would be safe from the
Americans.161 If Hopkins had been more direct in his attack on Nassau, then the
governor would not have had time to send the powder to another location, and the
Americans would have captured all of it. The American forces desperately needed the
powder that could have been captured by Hopkins, far more than any of the weapons that
were actually captured at Nassau.162 Instead, though, Hopkins chose to sit in the harbor
waiting, which gave Governor Browne time to get the powder on board the schooner, St.
John, commanded by Lieutenant William Grant, and to send it to St. Augustine.163 On
his way to St. Augustine, Grant had rebel ships that pursued him, but he did manage to
make it safely to St. Augustine. Upon his arrival Grant sent a note to Governor Patrick
Tonyn, which told of what happened in New Providence. Grant believed that St.
Augustine was next, “And I doubt not but you may expect a Visit from some of the Rebel

160

Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 97.
“Brown to Vice Admiral Gayton,” volume 4, 463.
162
Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 97.
163
“Journal of H.M. Schooner St. John, Lieutenant William Grant, March 2-4, 1776,” reprinted in Naval
Documents of the American Revolution, volume 4, comp. William Bell Clark, (United States Naval
Department, 1969) 225.
161

4

Vessels as I imagine they are in pursuit of me.”164 Grant managed to save most of the
powder that was kept at Fort Nassau by taking it to St. Augustine, but he was unable to
save all of it.165
The Americans were able to capture twenty-four casks of power from Fort
Nassau.166 While this amount of powder aided the Americans, it hardly compared with
the other stores that they managed to take during their siege of New Providence. From
Fort Montagu the Americans took, “17 cannon, from 9 to 36 pounders, 1240 round shot,
121 shells, 81 iron trucks for carriages, 22 copper hoops, 1 worm, 2 copper powder
measures, 1 ladle. Some old iron, copper, and lead.”167 Although this was a sizeable
haul, the prizes taken from Fort Nassau more than doubled these in number. From Fort
Nassau the Americans took seventy-one cannon, five thousand three hundred thirty-seven
shells, nine thousand eight hundred thirty-one round shot, four hundred seven copper
hoops, eight hundred0sixteen fuses, and twenty-four casks of powder.168 This was only a
small portion of what the American fleet was able to capture from the fort. In addition
they took copper ladles, flint rope, and some other provisions.169 The American force
spent two weeks in New Providence loading the supplies into their ships and enjoying the
wine that they took and were given.170 No matter how many provisions they were able to
take though, the American fleet had missed the bulk of the gunpowder because of
Hopkins’s inaction. The disgruntled nature of the Americans was captured in the account
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of the battle that John Paul Jones sent to the king of France.171 In this journal Jones was
very critical of how Hopkins handled the situation, even stating that he could have done a
better job. Despite his criticism Jones did not fail to highlight that the attack on Nassau
was a success.172
Despite Hokins’s shortcomings that as a captain, he was representative of the
form that the Navy took in the early years of the war. Although he was given orders to
clear the American coast, Hopkins chose to ignore these orders so that he could take
advantage of a more valuable opportunity: attacking and raiding the forts of New
Providence.173 He made the decision to not listen to orders and was able to carry out his
plan because his crew also preferred an attack that promised to bring them prizes. These
actions demonstrated that although there were hierarchies in place to govern the
Continental Navy and its captains, they were not strong enough to actually maintain
order. Had the Marine Committee been strong enough to regulate the actions of its
captains, Hopkins would never have been able to lead his attack on Nassau.
Although the attack on New Providence was in direct violation of Hopkins’s
orders it was one of the naval fleets’ most successful missions because of the amount of
munitions and provisions that were captured there. The extent of this success
demonstrated that at times the independent, decentralized nature of the Continental Navy
was beneficial because it allowed captains to make the most of the opportunities that they
saw as vital to the Revolutionary cause. In addition, it demonstrated, like Machias, that
the further these independent actions occurred from the central government the better
171
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chance of success they had in carrying out their independent plans. Although New
Providence was a populous island, it was far from the colonies. This allowed Hopkins to
carry out an unsolicited attack, and not have the government find out until it was too late.
Had New Providence been closer to Philadelphia the Continental Congress could have
stepped in, and stopped the attack. This would have denied what was considered to be a
very important victory for the American fleet.
The American fleet was not alone in recognizing the importance of this battle. In
his letter to Vice Admiral Molyneux Shuldham on March 8, 1776, Lieutenant William
Grant recorded his reaction to the attack, which demonstrated that the American victory
was not taken lightly. Grant was so enraged by the attack that he spoke of the Royal
Navy taking vengeance on the Americans, “And I am Positive the whole Rebel Fleet and
Armament will fall a sacrifice if attacked.”174 Grant’s bravado in regard to the Royal
Navy’s ability to defeat the Americans made it clear that he still felt as though the British
were superior.175 Given the ease with which the Americans took Nassau, however, the
British seemed weak, while the Americans seemed strong and sure of their abilities.
Lieutenant Grant was not the only one that wanted to see the Americans crushed. In his
letter to Vice Admiral Gayton, John Brown expressed his desire that the British Navy
attack the American fleet, and save the British colonists in the Caribbean from further
American attack.176 Brown’s letter acknowledged the strength of the American fleet
because he felt as though it was a realistic possibility that they would attack again, which
was why he wrote to Gayton in the first place. Brown’s letter also made it clear that he
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still believed in the strength of the Royal Navy.177 This letter demonstrated that although
the Continental Navy was disorganized and decentralized in the early years of the war, it
was still a strong force.
Brown’s request for aid from the Royal Navy did not fall on deaf ears. On March
14, 1776 a council was held on board the Scarborough to discuss the possibility of the
Royal Navy providing New Providence with protection.178 This once again demonstrated
the strength of the American Navy, as shown through the Battle of Nassau, because as the
Royal Navy posed a legitimate concern to the residents of Machias after the battle there,
so the American Navy was seen as a real threat to the British admiralty and the residents
of New Providence. Despite their clear concerns, the men at this council did not reach a
conclusion about giving aid to New Providence. They decided to submit a request for
assistance to Sir Peter Parker, who was supposed to have a large force with him at Cape
Fear.179 Their hope was that Sir Parker would send this force to the Caribbean to assist
New Providence and the surrounding islands.180 The one decision that the council did
reach was in regard to the American fleet. They decided that it was detrimental for them
to leave the port of Savannah in order to pursue the Americans because it would leave the
harbor vulnerable.181
On their way back to the United Colonies, Hopkins’s fleet suffered a run in with
the H.M.S. Glasgow off of Block Island. There was a brief exchange of fire, during
which the Glasgow received a broadside from two of the American vessels. This fire
177

Ibid.
“Minutes of a Council Held on Board His Majesty’s Ship Scarborough, Savanah River in Georgia this
14th March, 1776,” reprinted in Naval Documents of the American Revolution, volume 4, comp. William
Bell Clark, (United States Naval Department, 1969) 343-344.
179
Ibid, 344.
180
“Minutes of a Council on the Scarborough,” volume 4, 344.
181
Ibid.
178

4

greatly weakened the Glasgow, which caused her to run from the fight.182 The American
fleet did not just vanquish the Glasgow, but also managed to capture a brig and three
smaller ships that had accompanied the Glasgow.183 After the engagement with the
American fleet the Glasgow returned to its harbor a broken ship, “…under all the sail she
could set, yelping from the mouths of her cannon (like a broken leg’d dog) in token of her
being sadly wounded.”184 The damage that just two Continental Navy ships did to the
Glasgow further demonstrated the strength of this new navy. This victory was made even
more impressive because Hopkins’s force was greatly weakened by a small pox outbreak
that was running through the fleet. This outbreak was so bad that the Andrew Doria,
where all the men had been vaccinated, was turned into a hospital ship.185 Hopkins force
was so greatly reduced that upon reaching American shores a letter was sent by Gurdon
Saltonstall on his behalf to General Washington requesting that one hundred fifty to two
hundred men in Washington’s troops be enlisted as seamen.186
This correspondence demonstrated that the army and the navy, while separate
entities, were connected with each other, and that often their forces were drawn from the
same pool. This connection aided the naval captains in maintaining their independence
because instead of being forced to turn to the Marine Committee when they were in need
of something they could instead turn to the Continental Army. Thus, the power that the
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Marine Committee had over the Continental Navy was weakened, which allowed the
captains to act on their own desires and opportunities, instead of following commands.
The lack of control that the Marine Committee had over the Contiental Navy, and the
interconnectedness between the navy and the army, played a major role in the Battle of
Nassau, and continued to play an important role in other battles during the first years of
the war.
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Chapter Five: The Battle of Valcour
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Although it was a major defeat for American naval forces, the Battle of Valcour
on Lake Champlain in October 1776 was a key battle for American sailors. It pitted
Benedict Arnold’s forces against a much stronger Royal Navy and demonstrated to the
world that Americans, whether they were trained seamen or not, were able to put up a
good fight. It also demonstrated the independent and decentralized nature of the
Contiental Navy in the early years of the war because Arnold, who was not an officer in
the Navy, was able to decide that an American fleet should take on the British fleet on
Lake Champlain. Arnold was so sure that this was the correct course to take that he and
his men built nearly their entire fleet in the forests surrounding Lake Champlain so that
they could directly face the British fleet. This battle established the American and British
holdings in upstate New York, and laid the foundation for the American victory at Fort
Ticonderoga. It did more than just that though; it demonstrated that in October 1776, a
year after its creation, the Continental Navy maintained its decentralized nature, which
was so prevalent in the battles waged at sea in 1775 and the early months of 1776.
For Fowler, the most important aspect of the Battle of Valcour was that it
positioned the Americans for their victory at Saratoga. His discussion begins with the
American decision to build a fleet for Lake Champlain. Fowler praised Arnold for the
energy and dedication that he put into the project of building gondolas and galleys to
assist the few ships the Americans already had on Lake Champlain. He stated that
Arnold got involved in everything because he wanted to ensure that it was done right. In
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Rebels Under Sail, Fowler stated that Carleton, the British commander, felt the need to
establish a fleet on the lake after Arnold began constructing his fleet. This decision was
caused by Arnold’s efforts, but it was also something that Carleton had wanted from the
onset, because he recognized the importance of Champlain. Unfortunately for Carleton
though, it took a very long time for him to get a fleet of any size or power to Champlain,
because the ships had to be carried over a land portage to get them around the rapids on
the Richelieu. According to Fowler this delay, which also delayed the battle on Lake
Champlain, was the reason that the British army and Royal Navy did not continue their
assault against the Americans. This delay allowed the Americans to strengthen their
forces at Ticonderoga over the next year, which would allow the Americans to be better
prepared for the Battle of Saratoga in October 1777.
In Sea of Glory, Miller took a different approach from Fowler. Instead of
examining how this battle set the colonists up for their important victory at Saratoga,
which was considered to be a major turning point of the war, Miller focused on the actual
construction of the two fleets. Miller began by discussing Arnold’s fleet, which was
constructed in the forests surrounding Lake Champlain. He stated that Arnold was
credited with the design of the fleet, and with being the impetus, which started its
construction. Miller thus gave Arnold a much more active role in the construction of the
fleet from the onset than Fowler did. In addition, Miller like Fowler, examined the
difficulties that Arnold faced in getting an experienced crew to man his new fleet, and
credited the construction of the American fleet as being the reason behind Carleton’s
work to construct a British fleet for Lake Champlain. Miller also spent more time
discussing the technological advancements that were suggested by Lieutenant John
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Schanck to Carleton to make the portage of the ships easier. Miller closed his chapter by
creating a romanticized picture of Arnold and the battle that ensued on Lake Champlain.
The only mention of Saratoga in Miller’s work comes in the very last paragraph of his
chapter on Valcour, where he quotes another historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who stated,
like Fowler, that the battle on Lake Champlain was crucial to the American victory at
Saratoga.
Although Miller and Fowler each took a different approach to the Battle of
Valcour, they came to the same conclusion that it laid the foundation for the American
victory at Saratoga a year latter. Paul Nelson, however, in his article for New York
History, titled, “Guy Carleton versus Benedict Arnold: The Campaign of 1776 in Canada
and on Lake Champlain,” took a very different approach. Unlike Miller and Fowler who
were in agreement with Mahan about the role that Valcour played in the victory at
Saratoga, Nelson refused to accept this as the main reason for the outcome. Nelson
instead chose to focus on both the British and American commanders who played a vital
role in the Battle of Valcour. He spent much of his article looking at the weaknesses of
Carleton, stating that it was Carleton’s inaction that allowed for the delay to occur just
prior to the battle, and that it had nothing to do with Arnold’s plans. Nelson was very
critical of Carleton, but Arnold and Gates did not escape his criticisms. Instead forward
thinking leaders, he presented them as responding to the British attempts to build a fleet.
In addition, he criticized Arnold for not obeying Gates’s orders to return to Ticonderoga
if the British fleet was superior, and Gates was criticized for ordering this return. After
Nelson took the time to examine the materials surrounding the Battle of Valcour he came
to the conclusion that the American victory at Saratoga was not the result of the delay
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caused by Valcour, but was rather the result of Carleton’s hesitancy to launch an attack
against the American forces. In this way Nelson’s arguments were in direct opposition to
the ideas presented by both Fowler and Miller.
Despite Nelson’s argument that the Battle of Valcour did not aid the American
victory at Saratoga, it was clear that it did in fact play a role. This battle did not only
establish a delay that allowed the Americans to better prepare for Saratoga, but it also
demonstrated that in 1776 the actions of the navy were still far more independent and
decentralized than those of the army. This was seen through Arnold’s decision to ignore
Gates’s orders and his decision to fight a naval battle on Lake Champlain (which did not
come from the Marine committee).188 It all began in late summer and early fall of 1776
when the Americans decided to abandon Crown Point at a war council.189 However, with
this decision Americans feared that they would be seen as giving up their claim on the
lake, “to quash any rumors that by giving up Crown Point they intended to give up the
lake, they further resolved at their meeting to take ‘Effectual Measures’ for securing
Champlain by building more “Gundolas, Row Gallies, [and] Armed Batteaus.’”190 From
here the construction began on these ships, and was pushed along by the “motivation”
that Arnold supplied. Although Arnold’s sailing experience was only trading with the
West Indies, he paid close attention to every detail of the ships that were being
constructed.191 Once Arnold made it clear how he expected these vessels to be
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constructed he quickly left Skenesborough where they were being built to return to
Ticonderoga, where he attempted to find the men he needed to man his fleet.192
Arnold managed to get enough men to operate his fleet, but many of them had
never sailed before, which was a detriment to his fleet.193 Despite all of his efforts,
Arnold would not be able to compete with the British fleet that was developing at St.
John, on the opposite end of the lake. British commander, Guy Carleton, had long had
his eyes trained on Lake Champlain, which he recognized as valuable to both the British
and the Americans because it provided the Americans with access to Quebec, and the
British with access to New York.194 In order to ensure that he kept control of Lake
Champlain, Carleton received help from Charles Douglas, a more than competent captain
of the Royal Navy. Douglas and his men were responsible for creating the British fleet
on Lake Champlain and figuring out a way to get the British war ships anchored in the St.
Lawrence to St. Johns.195
The problem with this was that there was a portage around the rapids in the
Richelieu. This portage greatly slowed the British progress in getting their fleet to St.
John, which caused the battle with the Americans to take place at the end of the season,
just before ice formed on the lake. In addition, the ship the Inflexible, had to be finished
at St. Johns, further delaying the British fleet.196 Although the decision to get large
British warships to St. Johns instead of building their own small fleet ultimately paid off
for the British because they had bigger and better ships than the large, but weak
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American fleet, the delay it took to assemble this powerful British force made further
advances after the battle improbable.197
In October 1776, the two fleets took to the water as they vied for control of the
lake and access to Quebec. Before the battle began, Arnold had little knowledge of how
powerful the British fleet that he was about to face was.198 The British fleet was actually
smaller than the American fleet in number of ships. Compared to the Americans, who
had sixteen ships, the Royal fleet had only five main ships, but they also had twenty gun
boats and twenty-eight long boats, each lightly armed. (see tables 1 and 2).199 Where the
British outnumbered the Americans was with the strength of the guns that they had, and
with the number of men that they had to man their ships.200 The Royal Fleet had double
the firepower of the American fleet, whose guns were mostly two pounders. In addition,
the British fleet had about seven hundred seamen, each of which was experienced and a
member of the Royal Navy. Arnold, by contrast, had eight hundred fifty-six men, the
majority of whom had never set foot on a ship before the battle on Lake Champlain.201
These factors combined to give the British a decisive advantage over the Americans.
Table 1: The British Fleet:
Ship

Armament

Commanding Officer

Inflexible, ship

18-12 pounders

Lieutenant Schank
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Maria, schooner

14-6 pounders

Lieutenant Starke

Carleton, schooner

12-6 poundrs

Lieutenant Dacres

Thunderer, radeau

6-24 pounders
6-12 pounders
2 Howitzers
7-9 pounders

Lieutenant Scott

Loyal Convert, gondola
20 gun boats
Four long boats
Twenty-four long boats
202

Some 24 pounders, 9
pounders and Howitzers.
Carriage gun
No armament, just
provisions.

Table 2: The American Fleet:
Ship

Armament

Enterprise, sloop

12 guns

Royal Savage, schooner

12 guns

Revenge, schooner

8 guns

Liberty, schooner

8 guns

Lee, row-galley

6 guns

Trumbull, row-galley

8 guns

Congress, row-galley

8 guns

Washington, row-galley

8 guns

8 gondolas

3 guns a piece
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Lieutenant Longcroft

The battle between these two mismatched forces began on October 11, 1776
around 11:30 am as the British ships and gondolas came within musket range of the
American fleet.204 Within an hour the battle “became general, and very warm. Some of
the enemy’s ships, and all their gondolas, beat and rowed up within musket shot of us.”205
The battle continued in this manner until five p.m., when the British fleet moved back six
to seven hundred yards. This moderate retreat, however, did not end the British barrage
of the Americans. The fighting continued until dark, when it ceased until October 13.206
During the fighting on October 11 the gondola, the Philadelphia, and one of the
American schooners were lost in the action. The British used their Native American allies
to continue the attack on the Americans throughout the night. Despite these pressures, the
Americans were able to formulate their plans for the next day in the semi-calm of the
night.207
The next day the Americans headed towards Crown Point where they hoped to
replenish their supplies, which were greatly depleted from the battle the previous day.208
However, in order to reach their destination the American fleet would have to sneak past
the British fleet laying in wait. The fleet left Cumberland Bay for Crown Point at two
p.m., but the winds did not blow in their favor, so at first they made little progress.209 By
6pm the winds were in favor of the American fleet, and allowed them to hasten their
progress towards Crown Point. By six a.m. the next morning the fleet was only twenty204
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eight miles away from their final destination.210 At this point everything seemed to be in
favor of the American fleet. However, that morning the winds shifted again, and the
British were able to catch up with the colonial fleet, which ushered in the second day of
battle.211 Coming up alongside the American fleet the Royal Navy laid on heavy fire.
The American vessel, the Washington, was so battered from the fighting on the eleventh
that after only a few broadsides she surrendered to the British.212
While the Washington was the first ship to surrender to the British during the
early part of the engagement, it was only one of the American ships that succumbed to
Britain’s superior might. Three British ships attacked the American row-galley, the
Congress, at one time. The heavy fire that the Congress was exposed to caused its sails,
rigging, and hull to be destroyed. When the Congress was too damaged to fight, Arnold,
“[ran] her ashore burnt her and escaped.”213 At the same time that the Congress was
burned, the Americans also burned four of their eight gondolas to prevent them from
falling into British hands.214 After this engagement with the British, the American fleet
was able to limp its way to Crown Point and then on to Ticonderoga. The Battle of
Valcour cost the American fleet on Lake Champlain one third of its crew.215 In addition
to losing many of his men, Arnold, also lost more than half of his fleet, “our Strength on
the Water now remaining is one Sloop, 12 guns, Two Schooners, 8 guns each, Two
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Galleys & one Gondola.”216 This massive American loss hardly compared to the minute
losses suffered by the British. For example, the Royal Navy suffered only forty
casualties compared to the one third of the entire force that the Americans lost.217 The
Battle of Valcour was clearly a British victory.218

219

Although this was a British victory, the amount of time that it took the British to
prepare for this battle ultimately cost them Saratoga, the major turning point of the
American Revolution.220 The Battle of Valcour also revealed that the independent,
decentralized nature of the American naval forces was still a major part of the naval
warfare even at the end of 1776. Arnold demonstrated the independent nature of the navy
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because he was not afraid to take on a far superior force, and even refused to
acknowledge the possibility of an American defeat,
This Officer, fiery, hot, and impetuous, but without discretion, never
thought of informing himself how the enemy went on, and he had no idea
of retiring to when he saw them coming, tho so much superior to his
force.221
This demonstrated Arnold’s independent style of leadership because he was so confident
in his abilities that he did not feel the need to listen to his superior officers, such as Gates,
when it was recommended that he not take on a superior force.222
Instead, Arnold relied on his own intuition, and his confidence in his location on
the lake, to make the decision to risk everything and take on the British.223 That Arnold
was able to make such a decision without any consequences from his superiors speaks to
the decentralized nature of the Continental forces in regard to naval forces. This battle
also demonstrated the strong connections that the navy and the army had in this early
period, because although Arnold and Gates were in the army, they were able to carry out
an effective naval battle. Once again Valcour’s location in the periphery was important
to this battle. The location of Valcour made it difficult for the British to transport their
warships there. This delayed the occurrence of the battle, which in turn delayed their
attack on Saratoga. Without the one-year delay, the colonists may not have been
successful at Saratoga. Thus, the location of Valcour in the periphery allowed for a
delay, which prepared the colonists for a major victory.
The ramifications of the Battle of Valcour went beyond an American defeat. Like
at Machias, provisions had to be made for the protection of Ticonderoga, where the
221
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Americans feared the British would attack next.224 One way in which these concerns
were assuaged was by requesting that additional militia be sent to Ticonderoga. By
October 24, 1776 this request was met, and General Philip Schulyer had sent the militia
to Ticonderoga.225 For additional defense, Arnold stated in his letter to Schulyer that, “A
boom will be laid across the Lake this day, and a bridge to-morrow.”226 Arnold did not
just want more troops and defense for Ticonderoga, but also desired that more supplies
and ammunition be sent to the fort.227 All of this was done in preparation for the attack
that the Americans feared was coming.228 Luckily for the Americans the British decided
to hold off their attack until the following year because the season was getting so late that
ice would soon be forming on the lake.229
The American fleet may have been defeated during the Battle of Valcour, but that
did not mean that they fought poorly. Praise for the American efforts on Lake Champlain
appeared in the October 23 edition of the Pennsylvania Gazette. In this article the British
praised the Americans for their bravery.230 The American fleet was further praised in a
letter from Governor Jonathan Trumbull to Governor Nicholas Cooke, “[…] General
Arnold in the Congress Galley fought till he could stand no longer […].”231 The
references to American bravery demonstrated that although the Americans lost, they were
still recognized as being a worthy opponent. In addition, the British further demonstrated
224
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their respect for the Americans by quickly paroling the American prisoners, instead of
keeping them as a bargaining chip for the release of British prisoners. By October 23,
1776 the Connecticut Journal reported that the prisoners were paroled and on their way
home.232
The Battle of Valcour demonstrated how effective an American naval force could
be if they had the right leader, even if the fleet ended up losing. This was demonstrated
by the acknowledgement of American bravery during the battle, and the fact that they
managed to sink several British gondolas during the first day of battle.233 It also laid the
foundation for an American victory at Saratoga by taking the fight to the lake, which
delayed the British force. This battle captured the nature of early naval battles, and
further revealed the effects and connections that naval battles had with land battles.
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Chapter Six: The Land and Sea War
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Although the naval and land fronts of the war each had its own commanding
officer, the war at sea and on land was interconnected. A useful comparison can be made
between the Battle at Machias and the Battle on Lexington Green. These two battles are
often contrasted because they started the war at sea and on land. However, there are
many more parallels between these two battles. Machias and Lexington were not the
only areas of overlap between the two fronts of the war. Connections also existed
between the Battle of Valcour and the Battle of Saratoga, and between the army and
navy, more generally, as was demonstrated by the Battle of Nassau. Considering these
similarities yields a fuller understanding of naval warfare in 1775 and 1776 because they
reveal that American success in the war was dependent on the actions of both the navy
and the army.
The first battle of the American Revolution occurred on April 19, 1775 in
Lexington, Massachusetts.235 The trouble in Lexington began when British forces
encountered the town’s militia, which had been alerted of the British arrival the previous
night. Men such as Paul Revere, John Williams, and William Dawes spread the word
throughout the Massachusetts countryside that the British troops were marching through
the countryside.236 After hearing these warnings Captain John Parker mustered the
Lexington militia on the town green, so that they could decide what to do if the British
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marched through their town.237 At 4:30 a.m. the British regulars were fast approaching
the town, and Parker rallied his troops, “in a few minutes Parker had two ranks of a little
over seventy men drawn up about a hundred yards from the road to Concord.”238 The
battle began with a famous but anonymous first shot, and in that brief instant the
Revolutionary War commenced. After several volleys the British troops reformed their
columns and continued down the road to Concord. The Lexington militia was left with
eight dead, including John Parker, and ten wounded.239
The Battle of Machias did not lead to many casualties, and did not involve a
sizeable British force, but it still shared many qualities with Lexington. Lexington and
Machias were compared in an article published in the Aldine, called “The Lexington of
the Sea,” in 1876, because they each started a front of the war. This article stated that
James Fenimore first made this comparison.240 There were other similarities between
these two battles. In both instances the town Patriots were aware of the British
presence.241 In Lexington this was demonstrated by the troops that had assembled to face
the British, and in Machias by the threats that the schooners belonging to Ichabod Jones
would be attacked.242 Another similarity between these two battles was that the attacks
that occurred were made by a group of colonists dedicated to the cause, and not an
official military force, although the militia at Lexington was more formal than the group
of Patriots at Machias.243 Each of these battles demonstrated that a relatively small group
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of colonists was willing to stand up to a British force in order to protect their town from a
perceived threat.244
The Battle of Valcour and the Battle of Saratoga were connected in a different
way because the Battle of Valcour directly aided the crucial American victory at Saratoga
by delaying the British.245 When Benedict Arnold began preparing an American fleet
that could face the British on Lake Champlain, Carleton decided that he needed a strong
British fleet to take on the Americans. Unfortunately for Carleton, this required taking
the ships on a ten-mile portage to get around the rapids of the Richelieu.246 This delayed
the battle on Champlain until October, and thus did not give the British forces enough
time to pursue the Americans before the winter arrived.247 This delay gave the
Americans time to prepare for the Battle of Saratoga, which ultimately resulted in a
crucial United States victory. The British also faced numerous delays during the Battle
of Saratoga, which led to their defeat. As the historian Robert Middlekauff has noted,
“Burgoyne had delayed too long, and unable to cross the river, had no choice but to ask
for terms.”248 The Battle of Saratoga was the turning point of the war and guaranteed that
the French would formally ally with and assist the Americans.249
Although the Battle of Nassau did not directly correlate to a land battle in the
American Revolution, it still demonstrated the connections that existed between the army
and the navy. After Esek Hopkins successfully captured the munitions and supplies held
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in Fort Nassau in New Providence, Bahamas, he made the voyage back to the United
States.250 However, during this voyage many of the American soldiers became very sick
with the smallpox.251 This decimated Hopkins’s crew. In order to deal with this
shortage, he turned to General Washington to request that his forces be replenished with
men from the army.252 This request demonstrated that while the navy and army were two
separate entities it was acceptable for one commander to request aid from the other. With
connections such as this it was no wonder that there were similarities between the ways
in which the land and sea wars occurred. Each front of this war had its own unique
features, but when looked at together it became clear that in order for the war to be
successful, they needed to rely upon each other. This connection was further
demonstrated in the final battle of the war, when the Continental Army and the French
Navy came together to corner Cornwallis on the Yorktown Peninsula and achieved
American victory.253 Success for the Americans would have been improbable without
army and navy cooperation.
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The Continental Navy has long remained hidden in the history of the American
Revolution because when compared to the army it seems relatively unsuccessful and was
overshadowed by the mighty naval European superpowers. However, American naval
forces should still be remembered. This unique force brought together leading political
actors in Congress and local people in coastal communities who decided to take the
conflict to the sea, whether it was officially approved by Congress or not. From 17751776, the naval force of the United Colonies was a decentralized and independent force
despite having formal organizing structures such as the Marine Committee. The colonists
at Machias who engaged the British sloop Margaretta and the merchant Ichabod Jones,
even after a majority of the colonists supported his presence, demonstrated a bold,
independent spirit, which was similarly demonstrated by Captain Esek Hopkins who
ignored his orders to clear the British from the American coast and instead launched an
attack against New Providence in the Bahamas. Finally, Benedict Arnold and his
freshwater fleet on Lake Champlain ignored the advice of superior officers and engaged a
far larger British force.
Although each of these battles highlights the decentralized and independent nature
of the naval war in the American Revolution, they also demonstrate that Americans could
take on the British. Even at Valcour, where Arnold suffered defeat, the American forces
were heralded for bravery and determination. When put in the context of the land war, it
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is clear that the naval Revolution was intimately connected with the land battles. In his
book Rebels Under Sail, Fowler best captured the role of the navy in the American
Revolution,
Compared to the enemy’s squadrons, the Continental navy was a puny
force. Nevertheless, against overwhelming odds, they ventured to sea, and
in their own way, both by victory and defeat, they helped to achieve
independence. For that they deserve to be remembered.255
The American naval force that existed from 1775-1776 was like no other naval force. Its
commanders often did as they pleased, and answered to no one but themselves, but
despite its decentralized organization the navy managed to achieve victories against the
Royal Navy that successfully avanced the War for Independence.
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